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COMMITTEE PRINT

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN  
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

REPORT AND ANALYSIS  
BY THE  
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE  
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ON  
H. R. 2319  
(80th Congress)

TO PROMOTE THE NATIONAL SECURITY BY PROVIDING FOR  
A NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH SHALL BE  
ADMINISTERED BY A SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,  
AND FOR A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, A DEPARTMENT  
OF THE NAVY, AND A DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WITHIN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND  
FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NA-  
TIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WITH OTHER DEPART-  
MENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED  
WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY



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## EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

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On the other hand, long-run savings and increased efficiency will result if the Establishment and the agencies under it succeed in achieving hoped-for economies in facilities, supplies, research and scientific development, and other areas. It should also be pointed out that opponents of unification expressed skepticism concerning the claims made of the economies that it would bring about.

5. The proposed plan and the proposed executive order contained in the President's release of January 16 indicate that the Army has agreed to accept the Navy's position respecting the role of the Navy air arm and of the Marine Corps. The plan provides for a Department of the Air Force, but the Air Force is to be constituted by transfer of the Army Air Forces; the Air Corps, United States Army; and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command). These decisions remove some of the Navy Department's more serious objections both to unification and to the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force. It could be argued, however, that the decision to leave Navy's air arm intact makes less necessary than ever the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force.

6. The mechanism for coordinating the National Defense Establishment with civilian agencies has not at any time constituted an issue between the War and Navy Departments. The present proposals, calling for a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Resources Board, have been generally accepted from the time of the Eberstadt recommendations. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the National Intelligence Authority, Presidential creations, have performed some of these coordinating functions. The proposed agencies are related to, but not a part of the organization of the armed forces, and under the proposed bill would not be a part of the National Defense Establishment.

Since this report deals with the general problems involved in the reorganization of the armed forces, no attempt will be made to analyze the more detailed administrative provisions in the proposed bill. The difference of opinion regarding some of them may well arise. The basic question, however, is whether the compromise reached provides, under all the circumstances, a more promising arrangement than either unification or the joint board and joint committee type of organization. One of the major difficulties in attempting to reach an answer to this question is the difficulty of visualizing how the proposed method of organization would actually operate. The essence of the compromise is to superimpose a Secretary of National Defense, head of a National Defense Establishment, on the coordinating machinery recommended in the Eberstadt report. Perhaps in the course of hearings and discussion more light will be thrown on the Secretary's role and on the degree of independence reserved to the departments. Pending further discussion and clarification of these matters, widely differing conclusions are bound to be drawn concerning the significance of the proposed organization, and judgment as to its efficacy will be largely hypothetical.